Forty years ago, 96 percent of six-year-old children were enrolled in first grade or above. As of 2005, the figure was just 84 percent. The school attendance rate of six-year-olds has not decreased; rather, they are increasingly likely to be enrolled in kindergarten rather than first grade. This paper documents this historical shift. We show that only about a quarter of the change can be proximately explained by changes in school entry laws; the rest reflects "academic redshirting," the practice of enrolling a child in a grade lower than the one for which he is eligible. We show that the decreased grade attainment of sixyear-olds reverberates well beyond the kindergarten classroom. Recent stagnation in the high school and college completion rates of young people is partly explained by their later start in primary school. The relatively late start of boys in primary school explains a small but significant portion of the rising gender gaps in high school graduation and college completion. Increases in the age of legal school entry intensify socioeconomic differences in educational attainment, since lower-income children are at greater risk of dropping out of school when they reach the legal age of school exit.
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Over the past 40 years, the age at which children enter first grade has slowly drifted upward. In the fall of 1968, 96 percent of six year-old children were enrolled in first grade or above. By 2005, the proportion had dropped to 84 percent (bottom line, top panel of Figure   1 ). The school attendance rate of these young children has not declined (top line, same figure) ; it has held steady at nearly 100 percent for decades. But while in 1968 nearly all enrolled six-year-olds were in first grade, today a substantial share is instead in kindergarten. A similar pattern can be seen among seven-year-olds (not shown), with an increasing share enrolled in first grade rather than second grade.
As we will show, about a quarter of the increase in age at school entry can be explained by legal changes. Almost every state has increased the age at which children are allowed to start primary school. This is remarkable, given the strong evidence that, in the United States, starting school later decreases educational attainment. The other threequarters of the increase in the age at school entry reflects the individual decisions of parents and teachers who choose to keep children out of kindergarten or first grade even when they are legally eligible to attend. This practice is sometimes called "red-shirting," a phrase originally used to describe the practice of holding college athletes out of play until they have grown larger and stronger.
Redshirting is referred to as "the gift of time" in education circles, reflecting a perception that children who have been allowed to mature for another year will benefit more from their schooling. As we will discuss, little evidence supports this perception. It is indeed true that, in any grade, older children tend to perform better academically than the younger children. Natural variation in birthdays produces age differences among classmates of up to twelve months. Among young children, even a few months' difference in age can lead to substantial differences in cognitive and emotional development. It is therefore unsurprising that in the early grades there is a strong, positive relationship between a child's age in months and his performance relative to his peers. But there is little evidence that being older than your classmates has any long-term, positive effect on adult outcomes such as IQ, earnings, or educational attainment. By contrast, there is substantial evidence that entering school later reduces educational attainment (by increasing high school dropout rates) and depresses lifetime earnings (by delaying entry into the labor market).
Boys are more commonly red-shirted than girls (see Figure 1 ). Sex differences can't be attributed to variation in school entry laws, indicating that parental and teacher decisions are playing a role in the declining grade attainment of these children. Upper income, white, highly-educated parents red-shirt their children at the highest rate. News coverage of this trend suggests that these parents are focused not on their child's age but on the age of their classmates: red-shirting parents do not want their children to be among the youngest in the classroom. Parents believe that older children out-compete their younger peers in the classroom, on the athletic field, and in college admissions. Thus, eager to give their children an edge, parents are willing to hold back their child one year in order to shift them up the pecking order (Weil, 2007) .
Academic red-shirting manifests itself when kindergarten-eligible children enroll in pre-kindergarten. It also manifests itself in kindergarten repetition, which has been formalized in some school districts as "junior first grade," the "readiness room," and the "transition room." While the label and mechanism vary, the end is the same: children enter first grade-the historical entry point for primary schooling-at a later age. Children who enter school a year later reach the rest of life's milestones later. Since the transition from preschool to elementary school now occurs later in life, so too does the transition from high school to college and from college to the full-time labor force. In the late 1960s, 6-7 percent of 17-year-olds were enrolled in college; now, the figure is 2-3 percent. The share of 17-year-olds in 12 th grade or above dropped from 68 percent in 1968 to 63 percent in 2005. The recent stagnation in the high school and college completion rates of those in their late teens and early 20s (especially males) is partly explained by their later start in primary school, as we will show. Recent cohorts also marry later (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007) .
Combining these patterns, adulthood arrives later in life than it once did: childhood is lengthening. Historically, the boundaries of childhood have ebbed and flowed. Social historians and sociologists date the concept of childhood as a unique stage in life to the early nineteenth century (Ariès, 1965) . The concept of adolescence arrived even later, at the end of the nineteenth century (Kett, 2003) . Ariès argues that, when life was short, there was no time for an extended childhood or adolescence. The fluidity of childhood's boundaries is visible today in debates over the age at which people can legally drop out of school, drive, vote, work, drink alcohol, and engage in consensual sex.
Academic researchers have examined delays in each of these transitions, but have done so in unconnected disciplinary and topical silos. Developmental psychologists and other academics who focus on young children have debated the effect of delayed school entry on the academic performance of young children (Graue and DiPerna, 2000; Stipek, 2002 There are costs to the "graying of kindergarten" (Bracey, 1989) and some of these costs arrive decades after preschool. There is strong evidence that when the age of school entry rises so do high school dropout rates. Many teenagers leave school as soon as the law will let them. A teenager who leaves school as soon as he is legally able (say, at age 17) will end up with more years of schooling if he entered first grade at age 6 than if he entered at age 7. High school graduation rates in the US are stagnant or falling (Heckman and LaFontaine, 2007) , and the US is falling behind other nations in its rate of human capital accumulation (OECD, 2004) . Factors that decrease the educational attainment of young people should therefore not be taken lightly.
Most late entrants will not drop out, but will complete their educations and enter the labor force a year later. Decreased labor force participation among millions of young workers is salient to current debates regarding Social Security finance. The retirement of the baby boom coupled with decreased fertility rates is producing a sharp increase in the dependency ratio (the proportion of non-workers to workers). Increases in the dependency ratio tend to increase demands on government services (e.g., schooling, health care) and reduce revenue for programs funded by taxes on labor earnings, most prominently Social Security and
Medicare. Considering the volume of economic analysis and political debate that surrounds contemplated changes of a year or two in the Social Security retirement age, economists should pay attention to rising age at school entry and its implications for public finance.
Documenting the Graying of Kindergarten
While children enter first grade later than they once did, they are not staying at home. They are enrolled in kindergarten or pre-kindergarten. The top line of Figure 2 plots the share of five year-olds enrolled in school, which rose steeply through the mid-1970s.
This upward trend reflects the diffusion of publicly-provided kindergarten throughout the United States; the states in the south were the last to join the trend. Through the mid1970s, all of the growth in the enrollment of five-year-olds is explained by increases in their kindergarten enrollment; the two track each other closely (Figure 2 ). But beginning in the 1980s, the kindergarten enrollment rate of 5-year-olds began to drop. These children were enrolled in school, but at a level below kindergarten-public pre-kindergarten, or privatelyprovided preschool.
We next examine how much of the downward trend in the grade attainment of six year-olds can be explained by changes in laws. As documented by Bedard and Dhuey (2007) , among others, many states have increased the age at which children can enter school. The average cutoff date by which a child must have turned five in order to enter school in September of a given year has moved earlier in the year, though the cumulative change is relatively small: the (population-weighted) mean has moved from November 25 to October 14, or by six weeks (Figure 3 , top panel). Those who redshirt tend to be a socioeconomically advantaged group. Using regressiondiscontinuity methodology, Dobkin and Ferreira (2007) compare the characteristics of kindergarten-eligible children who enroll in kindergarten ("compliers") vs. those who delay ("redshirters"). In California, the compliers have parents with significantly lower education levels (8.9 years vs. 10.6 years) and are more likely to be black or Hispanic (59 percent vs. 33 percent). The incomes of complying parents are 40 percent lower than those of redshirters.
The pattern is the same in Texas, with the differences only slightly smaller.
Puzzles Explained by Rising Age at School Entry
Later entry to first grade leads to a number of downstream outcomes, including effects on grade retention, high school completion, and B.A. completion. Indeed, delays in school entry help to explain a number of puzzles in education.
Grade Progression and Grade Retention
An outcome of interest in economic and education research is whether children are enrolled in their "expected grade." The expected grade is traditionally calculated as age minus five, so that a six year-old is expected to be in first grade. Being below one's expected grade is typically interpreted as a proxy for grade retention. As one example among many, Shepard and Smith (1989, p. 6) write: "Despite its salience, rates of promotion and retention are not kept by government agencies. Instead retention rates must be inferred from the proportion of pupils of a given age who are not in the appropriate (or modal)
grade." We now show that much of the variation in age-for-grade over time is driven not by retention and promotion policies but rather by the age at which children enter first grade. cohorts. For these two groups, the intercepts are ten percentage points apart, indicating that the later birth cohort is ten percentage points less likely than the earlier cohort to be on time at age 6. The same holds at age 12. The two lines are parallel, indicating that grade retention was essentially identical for these two birth cohorts.
For those born in the early 1970s, by contrast, retention played a substantial role in determining age-for-grade. The share of this cohort behind grade by age twelve was about 0.30-about the same as that for the 1980s cohort. But the two cohorts ended up at the same place by very different routes, with children born in the 1980s entering later but being retained at a lower rate. Clearly, age-for-grade is a highly imperfect proxy for grade retention.
7 grade. Much of the variation over time in the grade attainment of these children is therefore a product not of changes in pedagogy, educational inputs or retention policy, but of historical variation in their age at first-grade entry.
Stagnating Educational Attainment
Rising age at school entry affects our interpretation of time-series data that focus on educational attainment at a given age. For example, a report from the U.S. Department of Historically, until the mid-1980s, changes in the school enrollment rate of 18-19 yearolds were driven completely by changes in the college enrollment rate. The college enrollment rate and the overall enrollment rates for this age group dipped sharply together in the early 1970s, as shown in the top panel of Figure 6 , as the threat of the Vietnam draft was lifted and the return to schooling reached its nadir (Card and Lemieux, 2001; Freeman, 1976 This aging of high school students affects our interpretation of changes over time in high school completion. Eighteen is the age at which analysts traditionally measure high school graduation, but a child who starts first grade at age seven will still be enrolled in high 8 school at age 18, unless she skips a grade or drops out. Rising age at school entry therefore explains part of the recent decline and stagnation in high school completion of 18-year-olds, which is shown by the bottom line in the bottom panel of Figure 6 . Again, we use a regression analysis to hold constant the year at which students start school. 5 Both the adjusted and unadjusted series show a decline in the late 1980s, but then the series that adjusts for age at school entry flattens out, as shown by the top line, while the unadjusted series continues to decline. Since 1990, the "decline" in the high school completion of 18-year-olds reflects the fact that these adolescents started first grade late and so could not complete high school by 18. The interpretation of this as a delay is supported by a similar plot for 19-year-olds (not shown): much of the decline is eliminated, and the adjusted and unadjusted series are essentially identical.
A similar pattern holds for BA completion, traditionally measured at age 22 ( Figure   7 ). While the unadjusted series is essentially flat from 1982 to 2005, the adjusted series shows a slight increase. Again, it appears that this reflects delayed attainment, since the series measured at age 23 is insensitive to this adjustment (not shown). Both the BA and high school figures demonstrate that historical time series in the educational attainment of young adults are influenced by changes across time in age at school entry. This is an important caution, given the frequency with which these time series are used to infer causal relationships between public policy and educational attainment.
Sex Differences in Educational Attainment
Sex differences in age at school entry partially explain the rising gap in the high school completion of males and females. Figure 8 (top panel) plots the sex difference in the high school completion rate of 18-year-olds. The female advantage was about ten percentage points for decades but began to rise in the early Nineties and now stands at 14 percentage points. Once we adjust for differing ages at school entry, the increase in the gap is reduced by about a fourth. Again, if one looks instead at 19-year-olds, who have had time 9 to finish high school even if they entered first grade later, the male-female gap in high school graduation rates is lower and there is no upward trend over time.
These sex differences can be tracked yet another step, to the completion of a bachelor's degree. The sex difference in BA completion of 22-year-olds has been fitfully rising for over twenty years (bottom panel, Figure 8 ). Women in this age group are about eight percentage points more likely than men to hold a B.A. degree, up from two percentage points in 1984. If we adjust for sex differences in age at first grade entry, today's difference is attenuated by about two points, or one-third of the growth over this period.
Further, the time pattern differs for the adjusted and raw series. In the adjusted series, there is no steady growth in the gap until the late Nineties; until then, growth in the sex gap in BA attainment is an artifact of sex differences in the age of first grade entry. This is a critical distinction for both academic researchers searching for explanations for the gap and policymakers trying to close it. Until quite recently, growth in the sex gap in BA attainment is attributable not to the decisions of adolescents on the cusp of college but rather the decisions of parents and teachers sixteen years earlier.
Explanations for Rising Age at School Entry

Increasingly Academic Curriculum in Kindergarten
What are the leading candidate explanations for rising age at school entry? 6 One plausible explanation for the trends documented so far is that kindergarten is today what first grade was 40 years ago, and so most children-those who do not delay entrance to kindergarten-are actually beginning the substance of their formal educations one year earlier. In this scenario, the main story is not aging first-graders but increasing standards in kindergarten. This hypothesis is worth systematic investigation, and none has yet occurred.
A number of papers have criticized a perceived shift toward an academic curriculum in kindergarten (e.g., Shepard and Smith, 1988) . A nationally-representative time series of standardized test scores for entering and exiting first-graders would tell us whether children now enter first grade better prepared and learn more when they are there, which would be consistent with kindergarten today being what first grade was 40 years ago. Such a time series does not exist. A systematic review of changes over time in curricula, standards and lesson plans for kindergarten and first grade would also be informative. We found no such review. Thus, the evidence that the schooling of these very young students has grown more academic is primarily anecdotal at this stage.
We conducted our own case study using curricular standards from the state of Georgia, which were available online. Georgia's current standards for kindergarten do appear more rigorous than they were 25 years ago, and contain some elements of the standards once applied to first grade. This case study is suggestive but not dispositive; it is quite likely that the states that best document their standards are the states that are increasing their standards, so our case study may provide a biased portrait of national trends.
Is kindergarten the new first grade? If so, we would expect to see a return to this additional year of schooling, in terms of academic performance in later grades and, ultimately, labor market outcomes. The idea that kindergarten is the new first grade would imply that 8 th grade is the new 9 th grade and 12 th grade the new freshman year of college.
Perhaps such a change is occurring at the upper end of the income distribution. In upperincome schools, high school students are more likely today to take Advanced Placement courses than they were 15 years ago (College Board, 2005) . There is no evidence, however, that such advances are occurring at the lower tail. Test scores provides no support for the hypothesis that nine year-olds and thirteen year-olds are more academically prepared than they were in the past. The share of 17-year-olds students performing at a basic level of proficiency on the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) has not risen at a rate that would suggest the majority of students are learning at a grade level higher than they were 20 years ago.
Accountability and High-Stakes Testing
Accountability programs and high-stakes testing are frequently blamed as a driver of increasing age at school entry (Weil, 2007; Stipek, 2002; Lincove and Painter, 2006) . The hypothesis is that testing in third grade leads principals and teachers to set a higher bar at kindergarten and first grade. However, age at entry began to increase at least a decade before the rise of high-stakes testing in the 1980s (Figure 1 ). The acceleration of this trend in the 1980s and 1990s may be attributable to the introduction of high-stakes testing, however, and this hypothesis bears investigation.
At least some of the recent changes in legal age at school entry seem to have been driven by concerns about performance on standardized tests. The sponsor of a North Carolina bill to increase the school entry age noted (as quoted in Weil, 2007) : "Our kids are younger when they're taking the SAT, and they're applying to the same colleges as the kids from Florida and Georgia." When California raised its entry age, the legislation cited the fact that the state's children were younger than those in other states in the same grade (cited in Stipek, 2002) and so were at a disadvantage in testing. Thus, states may be engaging in a "kindergarten arms race," with children starting school at an ever-increasing age in order to gain a perceived advantage on standardized tests.
Redshirting may be an unintended consequence of greater school accountability.
Those who decide when a child will start school-kindergarten teachers, elementary school principals, young parents-are focused on the short-term benefits that delay can offer.
Principals and teachers care about the welfare of their young students, and increasingly they are held accountable for their test scores. They are not held accountable for reduced labor force participation or increased dropout rates; in fact, they do not typically even observe these outcomes.
Competition between Parents
Redshirting parents appear to believe that relative age matters for children's performance. There is no evidence of a lasting benefit to education or earnings from being older than one's classmates. There is, however, evidence of a lasting competitive advantage in sports. In Europe and the US, children on elite youth soccer, hockey, swimming and tennis teams are disproportionately born just after the age cutoff for those leagues-that is, they are the oldest of their peers. This early advantage persists, with 60 percent more major league baseball players born in August than in July, mirroring the near-universal age cutoff of July 31 st in youth baseball. 7 Relative age effects could plausibly persist in other tournament settings. Admission to the most elite colleges is a rank-order tournament, for example. We are exploring whether age effects persist in this competitive arena.
Note that rank-order age effects are (at best) a zero-sum phenomenon. When one child moves up the classroom age rank another child moves down. Whatever their impact on individual outcomes, changes in relative age cannot increase social welfare. In fact, by allowing (or encouraging) parents to manipulate the age rank of their child in the classroom, schools may set off a cycle of social pressures that steadily pushes up the age of children at school entry, to the detriment of social welfare. The presence of older, more mature children in a class may lead teachers to raise their standards, resulting in lower relative performance and increased retention rates for children who enter school at the statutory age.
These increasing standards could, in turn, lead school districts to raise their statutory or recommended age at school entry, in order to ready children for the increased classroom rigor. And as the age of school entry rises, another round of parents will be induced to redshirt their children so that they can maintain their rank in the classroom age distribution.
This dynamic would be self-reinforcing, with parents always seeking to have their children be oldest in the class, relative standards rising, age of the entire class rising, and a yet-older set of children red-shirted.
In this sort of unraveling game, government can increase social welfare by constraining private decisions. One solution would be to set a single age at which children both can and must enter school. This is the approach taken in Norway, where students start school the year they turn seven and any exceptions are granted only upon a formal request and justification (Black, Devereaux and Salvanes, 2008) .
Childhood as a Normal Good
One explanation for delayed school entry is that parents obtain utility from keeping their child out of primary school for an additional year. As incomes rise, and if childhood is a normal good, parents may choose to purchase an additional year of childhood. The 13 demographic patterns of redshirting are consistent with this explanation, with higherincome, better-educated parents more likely to hold their children back. Given the rise in preschool enrollment of 3 and 4 year olds and sharp increases in maternal employment, however, the desire for time with one's young children is not the explanation. Still, parents may view the start of formal schooling as a symbolic transition out of childhood, and so choose to delay it if they can afford to do so. They may fund this delay individually, by paying for private preschool, or socially, by voting for free, public pre-kindergartens.
Costs and Benefits of Increasing Age at School Entry
It may be that delayed schooling is a productive investment, and parents, teachers and policymakers are making rational choices. When would delay be productive? In the classical human capital model, education is an investment that produces returns over the lifetime. Increasing the age at which children start school is efficient only if the (discounted) benefits of this delay at least equal its (discounted) costs. In this section we start with a brief, theoretical overview of these costs and benefits and then move to assessing the empirical evidence on these questions. In theory, the welfare calculation is conceptually straightforward. But the empirical evidence in this area is incomplete, and more research is needed to get a firmer grasp on the welfare implications of increasing age at school entry.
Costs and Benefits of Increasing Age at School Entry: Theory
We start with the possible benefit of delaying school entry. Consider a setting in which adolescents cannot quit school until they have completed a certain number of years (as in most of Europe); this simplifies the analysis. Given (say) ten years of compulsory schooling, does more learning occur if school starts at age seven than if it starts at age six?
We can think of reasons why this would be true. A more mature child may have a greater capacity to learn, building more human capital for each year in school; that is, he may learn more efficiently. This idea lies behind many educators' positive views toward redshirting and corresponds to the "maturationist" model of development psychology. If the maturationist model is correct, then the secular increase in age at school entry will make each year of schooling more effective in generating human capital. An alternative model is the "experientialist" perspective, in which children learn to learn by interacting with others and through new experiences. If the experientialist model is correct, then delaying school delays learning and produces no social or private benefits.
Now we consider the theoretical costs of delaying school entry. Holding constant retirement age, a person who starts school a year later spends one less year in the labor force. Her financial losses consist of one year of labor market earnings, as well as the lifetime return to that lost year of labor market experience. In our simplified setting, then, the cost-benefit calculation weighs the loss of a year of labor market earnings and experience against any additional human capital acquired due to later school entry.
Finally, we modify our simplified setting slightly. In the US, compulsory schooling laws constrain children to remain in school not for a given number of years but until a given age. Child labor laws, which reduce the opportunity cost of schooling by restricting the ability of children to earn money, are also defined based on age. It is therefore the calendar age of a student that constrains his schooling decision: the younger the student at school entry, the more schooling he is constrained to obtain. In the US, then, the cost-benefit calculation weighs the value of lost years of labor market experience and education against the value of any enhancements to learning that occur due to later school entry.
Costs and Benefits of Increasing Age at School Entry: Empirical Evidence
Estimating the effect of age at school entry on education and labor market outcomes is empirically challenging. Children who enter school later are likely different from those who start earlier. This produces omitted variables bias in a regression of these outcomes on age at entry. The bias is of an unpredictable sign: some children will start late because they are developmentally delayed, inducing a spurious, negative correlation between age at school entry and the outcomes of interest. Others will start late because their parents want them to rank high in the pecking order of their class and have the resources to pay for an extra year of private child care, inducing a spurious, positive correlation between age at school entry and educational achievement. Dozens of studies (reviewed by Stipek, 2002) run these unpredictably biased regressions; they typically conclude that there is an academic advantage to starting later but that it is gone by third grade.
Assume for the moment that the age at which children start school is randomly assigned, so our omitted-variables biases magically melt away. A researcher tests children in a given grade and relates their scores with their age at school entry. She sees that children who start school later have higher test scores and GPAs. Is this conclusive evidence that starting school later improves learning? No. Among children in a given grade, we can't separate the effect of age at school entry from that of age at test. In a given grade, any child who starts school later is also older when she takes the test. Except among those children who repeat (or skip) a grade, age at entry and age at test are perfectly collinear (Black, Devereaux and Salvanes, 2008; Cascio and Schanzenbach, 2007) :
age at test = age at entry + years of schooling This is a big problem, because age-at-test effects on test scores are strong and positive. This is especially true among young children, for whom a few months can make a large difference in cognitive development. Even before children enter school, a few months' difference in age produces large differences in cognitive skills (Elder and Lubotsky, forthcoming) . A teacher or principal observing these differences might conclude that, since older children in kindergarten do better than younger children, we should increase the kindergarten entry age. But the bottom line is we cannot determine the effect of age at school entry by studying school-age children, since we can never get away from the fact that age-at-test rises in lockstep with age-at-entry. (Black, Devereaux and Salvanes, 2008; Fredriksson and Ockert, 2005) .
In the US, researchers have also established a negative, causal link between age at school entry and education and labor market outcomes. One of the best-grounded findings in the economics of education is that compulsory schooling laws matter. Using multiple methods, multiple datasets, and multiple natural experiments, researchers have consistently found that legal constraints on when children can enter school, exit school and work for pay significantly affect their school attendance and attainment. Krueger (1991, 1992) launched this literature with their analysis of the relationship between quarter of birth, educational attainment and earnings among men born in the early 20 th century. The typical entry rule for these cohorts was that children who would turn 6 by the end of December could start first grade in September. Children born in the first quarter would therefore have to wait until the September after they had turned six to enter first grade, while their peers born in the fourth-quarter could enter up to three months before they turned six. The consequence of this later entry was that those born in the first quarter were one to two percentage points less likely to graduate high school than those born in the last quarter. These reductions in education have been shown to decrease life expectancy, happiness, civic participation, and earnings, as well as increase crime rates.
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Angrist and Krueger concluded that the relevance of compulsory schooling laws was fading with time, as social norms about children's work and education shifted. However, among recent birth cohorts the effects of compulsory schooling laws on high school graduation rates are about as large as those estimated by Angrist and Krueger (Dobkin and Ferreira, 2007) . This may be due to rising age at school entry, which makes a given school exit law bind for more young adults. Using regression-discontinuity methods with data on exact date of birth from Texas and California, Dobkin and Ferreira show that those assigned (by entry laws) to enter school a year later are about one percentage point less likely to complete high school. Among Hispanics the reduction is twice as large.
Two recent papers appear to contradict this extensive literature on the negative impact of later entry on educational attainment. Bedard and Dhuey (2006) find that those who enter later are more likely to attend a university track in British Columbia and more likely to take exams required for admission to a selective college and to attend a four-year college in the US. Puhani and Weber (2007) similarly find that those who enter school later are more likely to follow the Gymnasium university-preparatory track in Germany. But these studies show no positive impact of age at school entry on years of completed education.
Their results, like the research on competitive athletes, are consistent with the idea that relative age provides an advantage in rank-order tournament competitions to win access to elite schooling tracks, selective universities, and competitive sports teams.
Most students who delay school entry will not drop out of high school. For them, the cost of delayed school entry is delayed entry into the labor force. Assuming a fixed retirement age, these adults will have one less year of earnings at the start of their work life, and their subsequent earnings will be lowered by the loss of one year of experience. Data from Norway and Sweden confirm this prediction: those who started school later than their peers have lower annual earnings when they are in their mid-twenties (Fredriksson and Ockert, 2005; Black, Devereaux and Salvanes, 2008) , though this negative effect appears to fade as workers age (Black, Devereaux and Salvanes, 2008) . This makes intuitive sense: the loss of one year of experience will have a larger impact on workers who have recently entered the labor force than on workers with decades of experience.
Decreased labor force participation has social as well as private costs. The increase in the dependency ratio caused by dropping fertility and the retirement of the baby boom has been the subject of intensive discussion. The Social Security retirement age has recently been raised by two years, from 65 to 67. The intent of this new policy, which was the subject of extensive economic analysis and political debate, was to increase the years that workers spend paying into Social Security. Figure 1 suggests that this effort will partially be undone by increasing age at school entry. One out of six children born in 1999 delayed first grade by a year. These delayed students will be delayed workers who pay one year less into the Social Security system.
Conclusion
Given the pace of research in this area, we will soon likely have the evidence we need to more confidently calculate the social welfare consequences of the graying of kindergarten. While we cannot yet say whether the net effect is zero or negative, we can say with near certainty that increasing age at school entry intensifies inequality in human capital and social welfare. Both redshirting and increases in the legal age of school entry have this variance-increasing effect on social welfare.
First, increases in the age of legal school entry intensify socioeconomic differences in educational attainment and achievement. Lower-income children are at greater risk of dropping out of school when they reach the legal age of school exit; increases in age at school entry therefore disproportionately decrease their completed education. Analyzing data from the Tennessee STAR class size experiment, Cascio and Schanzenbach (2007) find that the later school entry has negative impacts on outcomes for disadvantaged children but not their more advantaged peers. One explanation for this finding is that young children who enter school later spend more time in unequal environments. Both at home and in formal care, children who start school later linger in settings whose quality is positively correlated with parents' human capital. This is exactly the point made by advocates of early childhood interventions: insofar as home environments are unequal, delaying public schooling increases the likelihood of unequal outcomes (Kirp, 2007; .
Second, redshirting disadvantages children who enter school on time. In kindergarten, the most advantaged children are the oldest in the class, reinforcing socioeconomic gaps in school readiness: "[C]hildren who may be at academic risk from factors associated with poverty face the additional hurdle of being compared to advantaged children 12 to 15 months older….the youngest children may appear to be immature and unready to tackle the tasks their significantly older classmates find challenging and intriguing (Crosser, 1998) ." Younger children in the classroom are more likely to be labeled as learning disabled (Elder and Lubotsky, forthcoming) . Ironically, the racial and socioeconomic segregation of the US softens this dynamic, since in our school districts the most advantaged and least advantaged children rarely share a classroom. But the standardized test scores of children of the same grade are compared across districts and states, and the relative ages of these children will contribute to the distance between the scores of rich and poor districts. 
